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La Guerre de Sept Ans : Histoire Diplomatique et Militaire. Par RICHARD WADDINGTON. Tome I. Les Débuts. (Paris : Firmin-Didot et Cie. 1899. Pp. iii, 755.)

Two years ago the author of this work described in his *Louis XV. et le Renversement des Alliances* the diplomatic struggle which preluded the Seven Years' War. He now begins the narrative of the war itself with an account of the conflicts in the cabinet and on the field from August 26, 1756, when Frederick set his troops in motion toward the Saxon frontier, until the disastrous defeat of Leuthen in December of the next year had ruined the Austrian army. This period he rightly regards as highly interesting, because of the skill with which the game of war and of diplomacy was sometimes played, and, even when there was bungling, because of the tremendous stakes that were ventured. His excuse for again going over ground so often traversed is that it has not been examined with such detail by any French historian, and that he has found much unutilized material, particularly in the Newcastle Papers in the British Museum, which until recently were not accessible, and in the correspondence of Kaunitz and Stahremberg. With the aid of this material he has been able to make much plainer the course of the negotiations which ended in the secret treaty of Versailles, May 1, 1757, the scheme for the neutralization of Hanover, and the Convention of Closter Seven. His descriptions of the principal battles of the two campaigns are sufficiently clear and full, but they are of secondary interest in a work like this.

M. Waddington could have given greater compactness and unity to his treatment of the subject had he occasionally summed up or sketched despatches of diplomats or soldiers which he quotes at length. He has by this method of extended quotation forced upon the reader work of analysis and characterization which it was his own business to accomplish. And yet such a method is not without advantages. The reader is brought so close to the sources of information that he is in a measure able to control the author's judgments.

M. Waddington regards Frederick's refusal to compromise with the Elector of Saxony at the outset as a serious blunder, because the Saxon army, though badly provisioned, was formidable enough to delay him until the season was so advanced that a campaign in Bohemia was out of the question. It would have been fortunate for him had the Elector, who was also King of Poland, retired into Bohemia, according to his first plan. Frederick's oppressions in Saxony made a bad impression in Paris and galvanized into a semblance of life the already dying enthusiasm for the Austrian alliance.

In some respects the best-worked-out story of diplomatic success is the account of Stahremberg's efforts to embody in the secret treaty of Versailles a programme which pledged France to a leading part in the purely Austrian attempt to ruin Frederick. As M. Waddington sums it up, Stahremberg had procured heavy subsidies for the whole period of the war, while all notion of reimbursement was abandoned ; and he had made the cessions of territory in the Low Countries contingent "non au re-

couvrement de Silésie et du comté de Glatz, comme l'avait accepté en dernier lieu l'Impératrice, mais bien à l'entrée en jouissance de toutes les conquêtes que revendiquait l'Autriche." And all this had been gained in spite of the demands which the struggle in India and America already made upon the French resources and in spite of the French desire to operate mainly on the lower Rhine or against Hanover.

Another incident which M. Waddington has set in a clearer light than previous discussions, particularly those of the English historians, have given it, is the Convention of Closter Seven. For this purpose he has made a large use of the Newcastle Papers. The Convention was signed September 8, 1757, by Cumberland, the commander of the Hanoverian army, as the only means of saving his troops from capture by the Duc de Richelieu. Although its terms were humiliating to Hanover, to George II., the King-Elector, and to England—how humiliating may be guessed from Horace Walpole's exclamation, "Believe me, it is comfortable to have an island to hide one's head in"—M. Waddington declares that Cumberland simply carried out his father's explicit directions. This conception of the affair is not a new one, for contemporary observers suspected the same thing; and yet it is possible to see from the documents and correspondence which the author quotes so extensively that the case against the old King is not quite so strong, and that Pitt touched the very sources of the blundering when the enraged George denied that he had given orders for such a treaty, and Pitt deprecatingly replied, "But full powers, sir; very full powers."

To prove his thesis M. Waddington carefully describes the directions George sent August 11 to Cumberland under the impression of the defeat of Hastenbeck and the rapid retreat of the army upon Stade. It is clear that Cumberland had full powers, and that George bound himself "tenir ferme et stable, . . . exécuter ponctuellement tout ce que le dit notre très cher fils aura stipulé, promis et signé en vertu du présent pouvoir," etc., etc. But would not the King's surprise at the extraordinary use Cumberland made of these powers have been natural in a person less shifty even than this old monarch? For, what in his mind was the controlling purpose of the whole negotiation? In the first supplementary note he says that he is sure Cumberland "ne fera de cette autorisation que tel usage qui aboutisse au salut de mes états et de mon armée," and in the third he repeats that he has taken such action "afin que tous ces pays [Hanover and its West-German allies] soient soulagées et les troupes conservées." He had a just reason to be angry then when he found that Cumberland had signed an agreement which did not accomplish half of the object of the negotiation. Nothing was said in the Convention about the treatment Hanover was to receive and M. Waddington himself describes fully the manner in which it was "bled pale." The Duc de Richelieu was so anxious to enrich himself that he winked at pillage by subordinates and the soldiers, who gaily called him "le Père Maraude," and the mansion he built in Paris with a portion of the spoil was fittingly nicknamed "Pavillon du Hanovre."

But this was not the King's only excuse. His instructions reveal irresolution aggravated by panic. He wants from his son further light on the situation, and asks that no agreement be signed until full powers to sign have reached Richelieu from France. On the sixteenth he also said that the negotiation should not be terminated until word had been received from Vienna in regard to his overtures for a separate peace. Here was evidently a desire to enjoy some of the benefits of an armistice, and at the same time to avoid paying the bitter price if some victory of Frederick's should turn the luck, or overtures from Vienna should change the face of affairs. Cumberland, feeling the burden of a desperate situation, could not penetrate his father's mood and failed to realize his father's hopes. M. Waddington is not quite fair in so unqualifiedly charging the King with duplicity because he denied ordering such a Convention as that of Closter Seven.

In his first account of the affair M. Waddington leaves the impression that it was the untrustworthiness of British promises which rendered the agreement worthless from the beginning. But it is evident that if the King and his advisers only waited for an opportunity to extricate themselves from their embarrassment by taking advantage of the strange omission of a time-limit in the terms of the Convention, the French court sought to accomplish the same result by interpreting the articles. The author relates that Richelieu told General Donop that the Hessians should lay down their arms as soon as they should arrive in their own country. This bit of information brought the Hessian contingent to a sudden halt. Furthermore, the reservations with which Bernis consented to the Convention were largely responsible, as M. Waddington later remarks in his judgment upon Richelieu, for the rupture.

M. Waddington gives one chapter to the war between the French and English in America, but he says nothing of the struggle in India, which he will doubtless describe in connection with its later and more decisive phases. In his list of books on this campaign he mentions none of the recent works except Kingsford's *History of Canada* and Parkman's *Montcalm and Wolfe*. His own account is, on the whole, satisfactory, although in certain matters of detail he does scant justice to the English side. For example, he speaks of Bradstreet's fight with M. de Villiers as a "combat indécis." A note explains that both French and English claimed the victory, and adds, to throw discredit on the English claim, that their losses were the heavier. But the English were fired upon from an ambuscade while in their boats proceeding unsuspectingly up the river a few miles from Oswego. When they succeeded in reaching their enemies the fortunes of the fight seemed never to have left their side, and the French were decisively repulsed.

Again in the attack on Oswego he regards the abandonment of Fort Ontario as premature because the French had not yet armed their batteries. But the fort was constructed of stakes or beams driven into the ground, a good defence against small arms and swivel guns, but worse than useless against cannon. And Colonel Mercer feared that if he

waited until the French heavy guns opened, the walls would be knocked to splinters, and he would lose both fort and garrison.

In his account of the unsuccessful defence of Fort William Henry, M. Waddington fails to do full justice to the gallant efforts of the defenders. He gives the impression that the display of the white flag was sudden and without sufficient reason. His eyes are too closely fixed upon Montcalm's skilful approaches to note the struggles and sufferings of the garrison. In describing the massacre which followed he minimizes the loss of life, even seriously quoting the ridiculous estimate of Vaudreuil of five or six as a possibility, though lending more weight to the opinions of Lévis and Père Roubaud, who were agreed that fifty were killed. Perhaps this is not too much partiality to expect of even so scholarly a French writer. The spirit of the narrative is studiously fair throughout.

It is unfortunate that a book so rich in material is not provided with a detailed table of contents, to say nothing of an index. The table of contents occupies half a page.

HENRY E. BOURNE.

Mémoires du Comte de Moré (1758-1837). Publiés pour la Société d'Histoire Contemporaine par M. GEOFFROY DE GRANDMAISON et le Comte de PONTGIBAUD. (Paris: Alphonse Picard et Fils. 1898. Pp. 343.)

CHARLES-ALBERT DE MORÉ DE PONTGIBAUD, afterwards the Comte de Moré, was born April 21, 1758. He was the second son of the Comte de Pontgibaud, whose estates were in Auvergne. In 1773 he went to live in Paris, where he at once gave himself up to such a life of dissipation that his family became alarmed lest they should be scandalized. Accordingly they decided to have him imprisoned and procured a *lettre de cachet* for the purpose, ordering him to be confined in the castle or *donjon* of Pierre-en-Cize. This was in 1775. In the autumn of 1777 he dug his way through the ten-foot wall of his cell and made his escape. Through a neighbor he announced this to his father. Having learned that Lafayette and other Frenchmen had gone to help the Americans against the British, he proposed to his father through the same messenger to try the fortunes of war in America. His father consented and granted him a pension, and ere long the young man was crossing the Atlantic.

His vessel was wrecked in Chesapeake Bay and plundered by pirates and he himself left destitute. He made his way to Williamsburg, and saw Governor Jefferson, who gave him a passport, with which he set out to find the army. He presented himself to Lafayette, who made him an *aide-de-camp*. He seems to have been constantly with Lafayette from that time forth.

His first battle was the battle of Monmouth. Of Lee's retreat he says: "I was present at that affair, when M. de Lafayette was under the orders of Lee. We were beaten completely; our soldiers fled in the